| MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS
INTER-CONTINENTAL WINS BATTLE BUT
LOSES WAR; LOS ANGELES HOTEL REFLAGGED AS OMNI Sources:
miscellaneous court filings in Inter-Continental Hotels Corp. v. California
Hotel Acquisition Company L.L.C., et al., Case No. CV 99-03293 R (MANx)
(C.D.Cal.) and Inter-Continental Hotels Corp. v. California Hotel Acquisition
Company, L.L.C., et al., Case No. CV 99-11832 RAP (MANx) (C.D.Cal.)
Only months after Inter-Continental
obtained a court order affirming its right to continue managing its downtown
Los Angeles property, another judge of the same court has refused to prevent
an Omni affiliate from raising the Omni flag. The hotel was acquired in
1997, shortly before Inter-Continental was acquired by Bass. The new owner
then claimed that the presence of two nearby Holiday Inn and Holiday Inn
Express properties constituted a breach of the territorial restriction
in the management agreement. Inter-Continental sued, arguing that the Holiday
Inn properties did not compete with the Inter-Continental. The federal
court not only agreed, but further went on to find that Inter-Continental
had an irrevocable “agency coupled with an interest,” with the consequence
that the new owner could not terminate the management agreement.
Unfortunately for Inter-Continental,
that was not the end of the story. The new owner had financed its acquisition
with a loan from Lehman Brothers, to which Inter-Continental had agreed
to subordinate its management agreement. After the new owner lost the litigation
described above, Lehman assigned its note package to an Omni affiliate,
which provided new, additional financing. Within months, the owner defaulted
and agreed to give the Omni affiliate a deed in lieu of foreclosure — and
with it, the right under the subordination agreement to terminate the management
contract.
Inter-Continental sued again, claiming
that the loan assignment, new financing, subsequent default, and deed in
lieu of foreclosure were a sham intended to disguise what was really a
sale to Omni (which would not have been subordinated and which would have
left Inter-Continental’s management agreement in place). A different judge
of the same court, however, found that the owner was simply exercising
its contractual rights, and refused to enjoin the owner from conveying
the deed in lieu of foreclosure. The Omni flag went up on the property
on May 5.
This has to be a highly disappointing
outcome for Inter-Continental, particularly given its initial success.
The first court ruling included potentially landmark victories on two highly
significant points: that the presence of affiliated hotels might not violate
a territorial restriction where the affiliated hotels do not compete with
the subject hotel (a pressing issue for the Starwoods, Hiltons, and Basses
of the world), and that Inter-Continental had an “agency coupled with an
interest” that prevented the owner from terminating the management agreement
at will. (It’s not clear whether in making the latter ruling the court
was aware of the numerous cases holding that the contribution of a flag
is not, by itself, sufficient to establish an agency coupled with an interest).
The second ruling rendered those victories moot. Worse, Inter-Continental
had argued in its court papers that the Los Angeles property was a key
element to its fledgling domestic system, because it enabled Inter-Continental
to capture Pacific Rim visitors who might then stay at other Inter-Continental
properties as they traveled across the country. If those arguments are
correct, the loss of this property could deal a sharp blow to Inter-Continental’s
ambitious domestic expansion plans. Ironically, those plans include the
upcoming opening of a new Inter-Continental hotel in Cleveland — on the
site of a demolished former Omni.
BANKRUPTCY
COURT REJECTS LESSOR’S ATTEMPT TO
USE BANKRUPTCY AS TOOL TO BREAK UNFAVORABLE HOTEL LEASE Source:
Dunes Hotel Assoc’s v. Hyatt Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2127 (D.S.C.
February 18, 2000)
The Hyatt Regency in Hilton
Head, South Carolina is owned by Dunes Hotel Associates, a partnership
made up of various affiliates of the General Electric Pension Trust.
Hyatt operates the property under a long-term lease that expires at the
end of 2016. In 1986, Dunes refinanced the hotel with a $50 million non-recourse
loan from Aetna. When the note matured in 1994, Dunes was unable
to make its balloon payment, and Aetna instituted foreclosure proceedings.
Dunes filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition to stave off the foreclosure.
In the bankruptcy, the Pension Trust
bought Aetna’s claim for $49 million, resolving the foreclosure issue.
Dunes alleged, however, that the bankruptcy had been made necessary in
the first place by an unfavorable Hyatt lease, which had prevented Dunes
from selling or refinancing the hotel. Seizing upon a fortuitous technicality
(the Hyatt lease had never been recorded), Dunes sought to “avoid” the
lease under bankruptcy law — that is, to declare it null and void.
After long and tortured proceedings,
the federal bankruptcy court refused to set aside the lease, and a district
court reviewing that decision has now agreed. Although the literal wording
of the bankruptcy code supported Dunes’ argument, setting aside the lease
would have frustrated the central purpose of the bankruptcy code: to protect
creditors, not debtors. Because Dunes and its partners would be the only
beneficiaries of that result, the court held that Dunes’ bankruptcy was
properly dismissed, and the lease therefore remains in place.
Few lawyers (and fewer laymen) think
that the purpose of bankruptcy it to protect creditors. Rather, most people
understand bankruptcy as a way for overburdened debtors to escape at least
some of their debts and to obtain a fresh start. As this case demonstrates,
however, that result is just a side consequence of bankruptcy’s central
purpose: to distribute a debtor’s limited assets among its creditors in
a fair and equitable way. The fact that the assets will be insufficient
to pay all of the creditors is taken as a given; the question is how to
distribute those assets in a way that maximizes the recovery to each creditor
and keeps any one creditor from receiving more than its fair share. As
this case shows, a debtor’s attempt to use the bankruptcy laws to generate
a windfall for itself, without any benefit to its creditors, should (in
theory, at least) fail.
FRANCHISING
TWO COURTS, TWO VIEWS OF FRANCHISE
TERMINATIONS Source: Days Inn of America, Inc. v.
Patel, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4503 (C.D.Ill. April 3, 2000); LaGuardia Assoc’s
v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4494 (S.D.N.Y.
April 6, 2000)
Two recent federal court decisions
dramatically illustrate the two sides of the current debate over the relative
bargaining positions in the franchisor/franchisee relationship. Although
the two cases were decided within days of each other, they reflect diametrically
opposite attitudes towards franchise terminations.
The first case concerned a Days
Inn in Lincoln, Illinois. After the property failed five consecutive
quality assurance inspections over the course of two years, Days Inn terminated
the franchise and sued for liquidated damages. Taking a traditional
approach, the court had no trouble finding that the franchisee had breached
the agreement. Although Days Inn waited until the fifth failed inspection
before terminating the agreement, the court noted that the franchise agreement
contained an explicit “no-waiver” provision. While the franchisee argued
that the liquidated damages were excessive, the court pointed to provisions
in the agreement acknowledging that actual damages would be difficult to
calculate, that the liquidated damages were not punitive, and that the
franchisee had the opportunity to seek advice before signing the agreement.
The court therefore awarded $120,000 in liquidated damages, representing
twelve years of lost franchise fee revenue.
The second case, concerning two
New York airport hotels, stands in stark contrast. For almost a decade,
Holiday Inn had given the Holiday Inn at JFK and the Crowne Plaza at LaGuardia
a two-month grace period for payment of their franchisee fees. In 1999
(possibly in connection with its acquisition by Bass), Holiday announced
that there was “a new sheriff in town” and that the grace period would
no longer be honored. Holiday declared the franchise agreements in default
and demanded that the franchise fees be brought current. When the franchisees
failed to do so over the course of the next ten months (despite several
partial payments), Holiday removed them from the Holidex reservation system,
and the franchisees sued to prevent the franchise from being terminated.
The case was heard by a respected
federal judge (best-known for his leading treatise on federal evidence
law). Surveying law review articles and treatises on the history of franchising,
the judge quoted various passages referring to the “unequal economic power
between the parties,” the way in which the “economic dominance of the franchisor
may be brought to bear at the outset of the relationship to create a franchise
contract that is unfair to the franchisee,” and the way in which a franchisor
can purportedly “capitalize and exploit the local goodwill generated by
the franchisee” by terminating an agreement prematurely. Given that introduction,
the outcome was hardly surprising: despite a “no-waiver” clause virtually
identical to the one in the Illinois case, the court held that Holiday
had “permitted [the franchisees] to become addicted to payment delays,”
and therefore “could not simply cut them off cold turkey.” The court held
that Holiday could not terminate the agreements, but set up a payment schedule
under which the franchisees would become current within the next 45 days,
after which all payments would have to be current and made by wire transfer
— a requirement that, “while not in the Agreements, is a reasonable quid
pro quo for this injunction.”
The cases are not as irreconcilable
as they seem at first blush. Because the New York case concerned
an injunction, the judge had considerably more leeway to do what he thought
was fair under the circumstances than the Illinois judge, who was largely
bound by the terms of the written contract. Likewise, by declaring a new
default with each failed inspection, Days Inn helped prevent the kind of
waiver that the New York court found when Holiday gave its franchisee ten
months to bring its payments current after the default was declared. Nonetheless,
the different approaches in the two cases are unmistakable, and you can
be sure that you’ll see franchisors citing the Illinois case and franchisees
citing the New York one in future franchise termination disputes.
A side note: the New York case also
featured a significant contract interpretation point. When the franchise
agreements were drafted in 1990, Holiday was based in Memphis, and the
agreements therefore provided that they would be governed by Tennessee
law. By 1999, Holiday had moved to Atlanta. The court held that because
the franchise agreements no longer had any connection with Tennessee, there
was no longer any basis on which to apply Tennessee law. The judge therefore
considered himself free to apply New York law, which he apparently considered
more franchisee-friendly. Thus, at least according to this judge,
a choice-of-law provision can be perfectly valid when a contract is entered
into, but become invalid as circumstances change over the life of the contract.
The court didn’t cite any authority for that novel proposition, and it
remains to be seen whether any other courts will follow.
SECURITIES
HOST MARRIOTT AND MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL
SETTLE TEXAS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP LITIGATION, WHILE HOST SCORES VICTORY
IN DELAWARE DISPUTE Sources: In re Marriott Hotel
Properties II Limited Partnership Unitholders Litigation, 2000 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 17 (January 24, 2000); “Marriott International and Host Marriott
Tentatively Agree to Resolve Litigation Involving Hotel Partnerships by
Acquisition of Partnerships Owning 120 Hotels,” PR Newswire (February 24,
2000); “Marriott International Signs Definitive Agreement to Settle Limited
Partnership Litigation, Will Take One-Time $39 Million Charge in 1999,”
PR Newswire (March 10, 2000)
Host Marriott and Marriott International
made substantial progress on two fronts this quarter in litigation involving
disputes over limited partnerships in which they were participants. In
one class action pending against Host in Delaware, former limited partners
had accused Host of making a tender offer which, Host purportedly represented,
was the only way that the limited partners could achieve a sizeable short-term
return. The limited partners alleged that Host then bought them out and
began making greatly increased cash distributions. The Delaware court rejected
a panoply of claims by the former limited partners, but did allow the case
to proceed on the limited issue of whether the cash flow projections given
in connection with the tender offer were false and misleading.
Shortly after the Delaware decision,
Host and Marriott International announced that they had settled unrelated
limited partnership litigation in Texas. Under the settlement agreement,
Host and Marriott International will pay $372 million to acquire all of
the limited partners’ interests in two limited partnerships which jointly
own 120 Courtyard properties. The limited partners in several other limited
partnerships will receive $31 million to resolve litigation over those
partnerships.
Ever since Host Marriott and Marriott
International were formed in the split of the former Marriott Corporation
in 1995, various limited partnership lawsuits have been a thorn in both
of their sides. After years of wrangling, it now appears that those litigations
are on their way to finally being put to rest.
SETTLEMENTS
ADAM’S MARK, RADISSON SETTLE SUITS
Sources: “Justice Department Settles Lawsuit Against
The Adam’s Mark Hotel Chain,” United States Department of Justice Press
Release No. 00-134, available at www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2000/March/134cr.htm;
“Radisson Has Settled Empire Hotels’ Lawsuit,” Hotel Business, p. 3 (March
7-20, 2000)
Two lawsuits that we reported in
past issues have now settled. First, Adam’s Mark has brought a swift conclusion
to the civil rights lawsuit that we reported in our Winter 2000 issue.
Under the terms of the settlement, Adam’s Mark will hire an outside monitor
to investigate guest complaints, monitor diversity and nondiscrimination
training programs, and establish a marketing plan directed at African American
markets. Adam’s Mark will also pay $4.4 million to the members of the class
action brought against it, as well as $1.5 million to the State of Florida
to distribute to four historically black Florida colleges.
Second, Radisson and Ian Schrager’s
Empire Hotels have settled the lawsuit reported in our Spring 1999 issue,
in which Empire alleged that Radisson overstated the reservations delivered
to the hotel. Radisson had accused Empire of using the issue as a pretext
to terminate its license agreement without penalty, and based on the limited
public information available, it looks as though Radisson may have gotten
the better of the settlement. Empire agreed to pay “a substantial termination
fee,” and an Empire executive was quoted as saying that he “would certainly
consider using the Radisson reservations system in the future if the opportunity
arose.”
One of the difficulties in tracking
hotel litigation trends is that while it’s easy to file a lawsuit, it’s
harder to win one. Put another way, the fact that a lawsuit is filed, by
itself, doesn’t tell you much about the merits of the case. Most cases
settle, and most settlements are confidential (either as a requirement
of the settlement agreement or, as a practical matter, because neither
of the parties is interested in publicizing the outcome). Where one of
the parties is a public entity, such as the Justice Department in the Adam’s
Mark case, the chances of a publicized settlement are far greater; indeed,
the Justice Department regularly places relevant press releases and settlement
documents on its web site. In purely private litigation, however, publicized
settlements are quite rare — making both the Radisson and Marriott settlements
all the more unusual.
To Our Readers: There’s
a common phrase occasionally heard at hotel investment conferences: “It’s
the late ‘80’s all over again.” Simply uttering that phrase conveys a sense
of concern, dismay, or alarm over issues such as inattention to fundamentals,
overbuilding, or general hubris. The same refrain is being heard in law
firms these days. Like the hotel business, law firms saw explosive growth
throughout the late ‘80’s. Like the hotel business, that boom was followed
by an early ‘90’s bust, which resulted in layoffs, reduced compensation,
and other forms of belt-tightening. As you may have heard, the boom is
back for law firms — and with it, increased lawyer salaries. Associates
in their first year of practice can now earn up to $150,000 in salary and
bonuses, about 40% more than just two years ago. To pay for these increases,
law firms are considering lower partner compensation and higher associate
billable hour requirements. Many firms also believe, however, they will
be able to pass off some of these increases to their clients in the form
of ever-higher billing rates. For the hypothetical client for whom money
is no object, or who doesn’t look at lawyer bills very closely, that strategy
may work. Another common phrase making the rounds these days, however,
is being heard from general counsels: “Over my dead body.” If you fall
into that category, it may be time to compare your lawyers’ billing rates
with the competition. Something to think about.
© 2000 Tuttle & Taylor, A Law Corporation
Hospitality Litigation News is a copyrighted publication of Tuttle
& Taylor, A Law Corporation. Hospitality Litigation News may be copied,
reproduced, or redistributed, in portions or in its entirety, provided
that the content is attributed to Tuttle & Taylor, A Law Corporation.
All other reproduction is strictly prohibited.
If you'd like to be added to our free mailing list, contact John
Dent at (213) 683-0608, or send him an e-mail at jrd@ttlaw.com.
|