Kevin Baker, M.Ec (Hons), M.Theol., Ph.D (Sydney) Adjunct Senior
Lecturer,
Australian International Hotel School.
Barton, ACT Australia
Abstract
In 1998, losses through fraud and embezzlement
by associates and employees at all levels property. corporate and
ownership levels -contribute to cost pressures. but there are limited studies
that quantify the degree of loss. This paper discusses issues of internal
control, especially some cultural factors that may inhibit the recording
and reporting of fraud, and attempts to quantify' the possible cost effects
of fraud and embezzlement on hospitality operations by using aspects of
Wanhill's model (1994). The paper puts forward examples of recent frauds.
and describes a study of eight properties operating in the hospitality
sector in Australia.
| "I didn't do it. Nobody saw me do it. You can't prove anything."
- Bart Simpson |
Introduction - The Extent of the Problem
The manager of a motel in Canberra. Australia, recently commented on
the subject of fraud, - "We
don't like to admit the extent of theft in our industry, because of
the special relationship we have with our guests. Customers come and go
in a retail establishment, but in a hospitality operation, guests stay
for an extended period and they trust us to ensure their safety. If the
public realised how much employee theft goes on in hotels etc., their trust
would be shaken."
It may not be easy to actually see people -employees - committing
theft, or fraud, or embezzlement. But can we prove anything
about it? For a start, the extent of fraud and embezzlement surprises many.
The Australian Institute of Criminology puts the cost to the Australian
economy of fraud and misappropriation of funds at $AUS 3.5 billion per
year, almost equal to the projected national budget deficit for 1997/98.
Adding the expense of the criminal justice system that deals with fraud,
the cost grows to $AUS 18 billion, or 4% of GDP.
The accounting group KPMG surveyed companies in Australia on the issue
of fraud in 1997. Of the frauds noted by the respondents, 77% were committed
internally. The highest number of frauds were carried
out by non-management employees, although where
managers were involved, the amount of the fraud was much higher.
The conclusion appears clear - fraud is a serious issue and there is
a need for management to improve internal control measures, but there are
questions for the hospitality industry - Are fraud and embezzlement as
prevalent in hotel and tourism operations as in commerce generally? Do
they constitute a serious problem, and if so. what is the degree of likely
loss?
The questions are urgent ones, for in 1998, hotels and tourism operations
are under pressure to contain costs arid maintain
rate structures, particularly in Southeast Asia and the associated
region at a time when currency exchange rates are volatile.
Recent Frauds in Hotel / Tourism Operations
It is not difficult to find some instances of recent fraud in hotels
and tourism operations.
| In Florida, a paymaster of a Ritz-Carlton Hotel was arrested for embezzling
nearly $6,000 by paying himself vacation pay in addition to his normal
pay. |
| A reservation clerk at a Marriott Hotel in Washington. D.C. stole more
than $270,000 by calculating agent's commissions on guests' self-booked
accounts and then paying those commissions
to his own fake company. |
| The manager of a Seawinds Hotel in North Carolina overcharged tenants
and issued false receipts to cover his thefts that totalled $6,600. |
| Two senior buyers with ITT Sheraton in New York were charged with taking
kickbacks valued at around 3% of the purchases they made on behalf of several
properties up to September 1996. |
| The manager of the Gulf Landing Resort was arrested after converting
$13,000 worth of resort property to his own use. |
These reported incidents have common features. They concern the theft of
substantial amounts, usually in payroll or purchasing divisions, and
the perpetrators are usually lower-level management
staff.
This bears out the Australian experience. Research by the Major Fraud
Group of the police of the state of Victoria revealed that one half of
those charged with fraud in 1997 were accountants or office managers.
However, it may be that the more substantial losses
to an organisation are not through such publicised scams like these, but
through quite small, "routine", regular embezzlements of small amounts.
These do not catch the public's attention, and their imputed existence
is often tolerated or ignored by senior management.
A further question arises - Can and should management take more concerted
action against minor acts of embezzlement?
The Degree of Loss
What is the likely loss to a hotel of minor fraud regarding stock, or
wage payments? Is it worthwhile taking action?
Wanhill (1994) has drawn on the work of Johnson (1983) and Mars and
Nicod (1984) and estimated that losses in food and beverage areas, through
"fiddles" and "knock-offs" by staff who consider such practices a part
of their entitlements, of up to 5% of inventory
would have disproportionate effects on break-even revenue and contribution
margin and could "seriously affect the viability of the business". A Coopers
and Lybrand study (1994) estimates that losses due to pilferage etc., could
be up to 8 or 9% of cost of sales. A 1997 study of member companies of
the New South Wales Employers' Federation, including hotel and tourism
operators, showed that merchandising operations accepted
"stock shrinkage" of 2%.
A study of Victorian retailers found that for the majority of operations,
effective security control could lead to a 20% to 25% increase in net profit.
In the area of wages costs, the American Payroll Association has estimated
that fraudulent practices. such as unauthorized overtime or errors in clocking
on and off, inflate payroll costs of the typical hotel by between I % and
1.5%.
Are these estimates of losses due to fraud and embezzlement of 5% of
inventory and 1 to 1.5% of payroll costs reasonable, possible and likely?
Quantifying the Loss - A Study of Eight
Properties Operating in the Hospitality Sector in new South Wales
Examining financial statistics such as cost of sales and payroll details
is a delicate task. Clearly, this data is highly confidential because of
its commercial applications. For that reason, it is not feasible
to survey businesses and ask management to disclose
their statistics if the information is to be published. However, the author
has had involvement with a number of properties in the course of accounting/audit
work, and can put forward a number of statistics provided
the institutions are not identified or identifiable. The study therefore
remains an indicative study only, but some conclusions
are put forward for discussion.
The intent of the examination is not to draw conclusions, for obviously
the study group is far too small and the methodology is inadequate for
that purpose, but the intent is to find some indicative percentages that
can be used in drawing up a model. The model may or may not be general,
but at least it is a model which can be applied in any property if figures
for inventory shrinkage or payroll inflation can be imputed.
Background to the Study
In the New South Wales State Budget of 1995/96, the State Treasurer
announced a new tax on New South Wales community clubs. These clubs, some
of which are very large and multi-site, provide entertainment,
resort accommodation, gambling, bar and restaurant facilities for
members and guests, and have hitherto been exempt from taxation on the
basis that they are non-profit and any surplus on activities was returned
to the community in one way or another.
The new tax was on poker machine turnover in excess of one
million dollars, and the announcement of the tax made
many clubs review the financial aspects of their operations.
The author was involved directly and indirectly on a professional
basis with eight clubs in New South Wales. These clubs, some of which were
in financial difficulty, sought to review and revise operations within
the new financial parameters. Some of the clubs were associated, and the
new taxation regime meant that gambling revenues were amalgamated and they
would incur a liability for tax, so they were considering breaking up the
associations into smaller entities.
As the clubs had similar food and beverage operations, supplying the
same range of alcoholic beverages and liquors and conducting broadly similar
food services, it seemed that financial data such as cost of sales and
payroll should be comparable and could provide insights into the experience
of fraud and embezzlement in this sector of the hospitality industry. The
incidence of fraud and embezzlement is otherwise difficult to quantify
for various reasons, some of which are discussed later.
The financial data is obviously of a very sensitive nature, and hence
the clubs are listed according to an informal code, and no facility is
identified nor intended to be identifiable for reasons of commercial confidentiality.
The data presented, which is generally amalgamated and disclosed annually
to club members, is examined only to discuss possible losses
through fraud and embezzlement and is not intended for any
other purpose. The aim of the examination is to seek indicators of the
presence of fraud or theft, nothing more than that.
The clubs are not necessarily typical of other hospitality operations
such as major hotel chains because all of them rely upon revenue from gambling,
such as poker machines (although NSW public hotels are also relying more
upon gambling revenue from poker machines after
recent legislative and regulatory changes). Hence the price of food and
beverage products can be subsidised, as it were, by gambling revenues.
This means that the cost of sales will generally be higher than in an operation
conducted on a full-cost recovery plus profit basis. For all of the
clubs, there is also a large amount of "Other Revenue". This includes club
membership fees, revenue from entertainment, or revenue from sources such
as green fees for a country' club.
Methodology of the Study
Extracts of the income statements of the eight clubs were recorded and
these were then dissected in a common form similar to that of the Uniform
System of Accounts. Although similar, the recording of payroll costs had
to be different from that of the Uniform Accounts, for three of the eight
clubs recorded payroll costs under one heading and did not dissect it under
direct and administrative costs, so it was not possible to provide a common
format without amalgamating payroll costs for the other five clubs.
Cost of Sales was recalculated as a percentage
of food and beverage revenue, and Payroll costs were recalculated as a
percentage of total revenue.
The club percentages can be examined in two ways:
(1) - To determine whether any of the clubs have significant variances
from the average of cost of sales and payroll percentages for the eight
clubs. Because the sample is so small, mean deviations should not be tied,
but instead the absolute percentage difference will be considered.
A significant variation in excess of the average for all the clubs may
indicate that the higher cost of sales or payroll are affected by unauthorised
usage, such as wastage or pilferage, i.e. there is fraud or embezzlement
occuring.
(2) - The spread of the percentages for cost of sales and payroll,
if not explained by other factors, may be an indicator of the degree of
fraud or embezzlement.
The following tables summarise various data. Table I lists income statistics
from all eight clubs and Table 2 draws out relevant percentages of cost
of sales and payroll.
Table 1
Extracts from Income Statements of Eight Clubs in NSW for a full finanacial
year concluding in 1997
|
Club 1 |
Club 2 |
Club 3 |
Club 4 |
Club 5 |
Club 6 |
Club 7 |
Club 8 |
| Informal ID Code |
E |
R/C |
P |
C/C |
N |
W |
Ca |
SW |
| Total Revenue |
$1,289,605 |
$3,497,397 |
$51,955 |
$1,776,424 |
$2,456,800 |
$1,396,654 |
$1,893,200 |
$1,725,560 |
| Net Gambling Revenue |
481,951 |
1,956,854 |
23,470 |
578,341 |
847,560 |
334,223 |
543,278 |
601,301 |
| F&B Revenue |
632,264 |
1,358,949 |
27,699 |
986,216 |
1,381,225 |
766,321 |
1,025,807 |
801,559 |
| Cost of Sales |
286,710 |
711,798 |
12,610 |
486,427 |
665,230 |
321,257 |
446,226 |
357,495 |
| Payroll |
474,520 |
1,062,498 |
19,196 |
722,992 |
837,772 |
489,522 |
755,387 |
652,262 |
| Other Expense |
57,655 |
124,865 |
3,363 |
57,654 |
64,997 |
52,455 |
75,989 |
65,729 |
| Departmental Income |
-186,621 |
-540,212 |
-7,470 |
-280,857 |
-186,774 |
-96,913 |
-251,795 |
-273,927 |
| Other Revenue |
175,390 |
142,556 |
786 |
211,867 |
228,015 |
296,110 |
324,115 |
322,700 |
| Undistributed Expenses: |
148,013 |
611,319 |
8,127 |
177,616 |
198,032 |
142,877 |
199,588 |
155,440 |
| Income Before Fixed Charges |
322,707 |
947,849 |
8,659 |
331,735 |
690,769 |
390,543 |
416,010 |
494,634 |
| Fixed Charges |
191,455 |
776,478 |
12,715 |
651,491 |
361,557 |
176,855 |
328,923 |
256,508 |
| Net Income |
131,252 |
171,371 |
-4,056 |
-319,756 |
329,212 |
213,688 |
87,087 |
238,126 |
Table 2
Comparison of Cost of Sales (to F&B Revenue) and Payroll (to Total
Revenue) for Eight Clubs
|
Club 1 |
Club 2 |
Club 3 |
Club 4 |
Club 5 |
Club 6 |
Club 7 |
Club 8 |
Average |
| Informal ID Code |
E |
R/C |
P |
C/C |
N |
W |
Ca |
SW |
|
| Total Revenue ($) |
1,289,605 |
3,497,397 |
51,955 |
1,776,424 |
2,456,800 |
1,396,654 |
1,893,200 |
1,725,560 |
|
| Net Gambling Revenue |
481,951 |
1,956,854 |
23,470 |
578,341 |
847,560 |
334,223 |
543,278 |
601,301 |
|
| F&B Revenue |
632,264 |
1,358,949 |
27,699 |
986,216 |
1,381,225 |
766,321 |
1,025,807 |
801,559 |
|
| Cost of Sales ( % of Total Revenue) |
45.30% |
52.40% |
45.50% |
49.30% |
48.20% |
41.90% |
43.50% |
44.60% |
46.34% |
| Payroll (%of Total Revenue) |
36.80% |
30.38% |
36.95% |
40.69% |
34.10% |
35.05% |
39.90% |
37.80% |
36.46% |
| Other Expense (% of F&B Revenue |
9.10% |
9.20% |
12.10% |
5.80% |
4.70% |
6.80% |
7.40% |
8.20% |
7.91% |
| Net Income |
10.10% |
4.90% |
-7.80 |
-18.00% |
13.40% |
15.30% |
4.60% |
13.80% |
|
Club 8 appeared to be the best run club, and returned a net income of
13.8% (which was not distributed as a profit, but held in various reserves
and used for club and community purposes). Club 8 had a cost of sales of
around 45%, as did club I (which returned 10.1% in net income). Club 7.
which returned 4.6%, had cost of sales of 43.5%. Hence, cost of sales of
around 45% seems reasonable for the industry, allowing for some subsidisation
of meal costs through other club activities, notably the gambling revenue.
These three clubs, clubs 1, 7 and 8, also showed unexceptional payroll
figures, which are calculated in terms of total revenue because most of
the clubs did not show Food and Beverage payroll separately at this reporting
level.
Club 5 also returned a good result in terms of net income (13.4%) but
the higher cost of sales figure of 48.2% has been partially masked by the
lower than average payroll statistic of 34.1 %.
It is difficult to explain why one figure should be higher than average
and the other much lower than average In this case it may be
that management accepts a higher cost of sales in providing higher quality
product and may incur higher than usual transport costs, although these
were not immediately evident on a walkthrough of the property.
Club 6 also performs well, both in terms of cost of sales and in terms
of payroll percentage, but there is a proviso on its reported performance.
Clubs 3,4 and 6 are related, and there is a reason why club 6 returns such
a good percentage net income (15.3%), besides the good cost of sales figure
and the mid-range payroll figure. The reason is that club 4 may have been
allocated too high a proportion of fixed costs and club 6 allocated too
low a figure. It appears that club 6 has good management, and club
4 indifferent
management, so it may have been that the management of club 6 were more
successful in putting an argument to the joint board of the three clubs
that the allocation of fixed costs should be as it is - to the advantage
of club 6 over both club 4 and club 3.
Club 3, the smallest of the group under examination, returns a net loss,
but that is mainly because it has allocated to it high fixed costs, partly
because it is a new facility in a small town and the buildings bear high
finance charges.
The clubs that have problems are club 2 and club 4.
Club 2 has a cost of sales of 52.4%, a high percentage, although the
payroll percentage at 30.38% is less than the average for the group.
The club returns a surplus of 4.9%, and it may be that the board
and senior management have not been under severe pressure to contain costs
and have allowed the high cost of sales to continue. It may be that the
products are not priced correctly, or that the high proportion of gambling
revenue has allowed management to maintain a high subsidy on food and beverage
prices. However, despite the evidence of tight management of payroll, it
must be asked whether the high cost of sales is due in part to pilferage
and wastage of inventory.
Club 4, which is in a difficult financial position, has almost as high
an inventory cost at 49.3%, and in addition its payroll costs are higher
than average, exceeding 40% of total revenue. Both percentages.
taken together, imply poor management
of costs, and there must be a concern that there is a lack of adequate
internal control over both inventory and payroll.
Indicators
(1) A first point to make, and it is a tentative one, given the very
small size of the study group, was that the three newer properties were
among the poorer performers. Clubs 2, 3 and 4 were all less than three
years old. Generally, they had higher fixed costs, partly reflecting the
higher costs of building of recent times. The other clubs, presenting statements
prepared on a historical basis, did not record as high fixed costs.
It may be that the high fixed costs obscured higher than usual operating
costs at board level. It may also be that the newer properties did not
have longer term data do use as comparisons for their pricing and costing
policies.
(2) Of the eight properties examined, one was certainly
poorly run and there were opportunities for fraud
and embezzlement that would have explained both higher than average cost
of sales and payroll costs. A second property may have had problems with
control of inventory. In casual conversation with managers and directors
of these two properties, no one would consider the possibility of theft
or fraud by their own employees. Loyalty is, of course, a virtue, but it
can also impede an objective examination of a situation implied by statistics.
Of the remaining six properties, there was a consistency of cost of
sales between four and the other two were explainable. This very consistency
suggests that aberrations should be the subject of a close and careful
examination from the internal control/audit point of view.
One or possibly two cases of inadequate internal control out of a group
of eight properties is an indicator that the incidence of fraud and embezzlement
may be significant.
(3) The range of variation between the highest and the lowest figure
for both cost of sales and payroll (10.5 percentage points between high
and low cost of sales, and 10.3 percentage points between high and
low payroll) bears further examination.
Such a spread cannot wholly be explained by discounting or transport
costs in relation to beverages, for the most common products in clubs (beer
etc) are similar and suppliers' prices are generally very competitive.
There are reasons for a spread in food costs, because obviously the quality
may differ, but once again there does not appear to be a sufficiently wide
variety of food services in clubs to explain the difference in inventory
costs.
The spread of payroll costs is also unusual in an industry where generally
bar and food services staff have their wages and conditions determined
by an award that is applicable in all
similar workplaces. The only substantial cause of variation must be in
hours worked, rather than in the hourly rate paid.
The indicators are that ordinary hours and overtime hours must be subject
to variation, and the question of control of these hours, especially overtime
hours, arises.
All eight properties had manual systems for recording hours, even
if the calculation and payment of wages were computerised.
In each case, employees submitted wage claims by means of time sheets or
timecards, and these time sheets were subject to checking and approval
by supervisors, often to a pre-prepared roster. However, overtime was generally
undertaken on short notice.
In the three clubs where there were above average payroll percentages,
the management of each believed that there was
"almost no overstatement of overtime", yet all three cases relied
on these manually compiled time sheets.
At this stage of the discussion, when the questions of control of payroll
and opportunities to defraud by excessive wage claim arise, it is appropriate
to consider the recent experience of US hotels which installed fully automated
employee attendance systems.
Implications from the Installation of Automated Payroll Systems
Two cases where manual systems were replaced by automated systems indicate
that this estimate could be a conservative one. The first case involved
the Los Angeles Biltmore Hotel. After a two-lock automated system was installed,
hotel management found that payroll costs declined even though occupancy
rose. Overtime claims were more tightly controlled, and the overtime budget
fell by 76%.
The second case involved the three hotel-chain of JC Resorts in California.
The installation of a similar system reduced unscheduled time, and eliminated
the possibility of "phantom" employees on the payroll.
Both these cases clearly indicate that hotels can lose a substantial
portion of payroll costs through employees "stretching the limits" as it
were, and embezzling small payments that they are not entitled to.
What if overtime is 25% too much, or 50% too much, or 75% too much (as
in the Biltmore's case)?
Applying A Model of Inventory / Payroll Loss
Professor Stephen Wanhill has developed a model for evaluating the impact
of restaurant fraud on income statements.
Wanhill considers losses through "fiddles" (e.g. taking cash through
not recording sales) and "knock-offs" (physical theft of goods).
In the examination of club figures above, both "fiddles" and "knock-offs"
will affect the cost of sales.
The basic income model for a restaurant is:
N= R + I - Cv - Cf
where A is net income, R is revenue, I is other
income, Cv is variable costs (i.e. assuming one half controllable
expenses such as payroll and also cost of sales), and Cf is the
remainder.
Wanhill develops the model to take account of fiddles as a percentage
of receipts. as:
N = (1-a)R + I - Cv - Cf
where a is the amount of fiddles of revenue.
However, using the model in another way, to consider the effect of "knock-offs",
where S is stock, and Ev is other variable expenses, and d% is the
amount of stock taken, then:
N = R + 1- Ev - (I + d) S- Cf
The effect of theft of stock is that every dollar's worth of stock stolen
not only has an effect on revenue, but has a direct effect on net income
N. In other words, every dollar stolen is a dollar's less
profit, or a dollar's greater loss.
Could loss by embezzlement be as high as 5%, even 8% of cost of sales,
as postulated by Wanhill in sample calculations?
The evidence from the examination of eight New South Wales clubs indicates
that it could be, for the range of variation in cost
of sales percentages is 10.5%. Perhaps one
or two percentage points could be accounted for by wastage,
or inadequate paperwork to record inventory movements,
but that still leaves up to 8% difference between highest and lowest cost
of sales in the eight clubs.
The direct relationship between increasing fiddles and knockoffs demonstrated
by Wanhill means that frauds and embezzlement, even though a small percentage
of cost of sales, translates into a large percentage of net income. For
that reason, this examination of theft indicates that the problem is a
significant one.
As the problem can have significant effects, why is it not more widely
recorded and reported? The answer may be that certain "cultural" factors
peculiar to the hospitality industry inhibit the recording and reporting
of fraud.
Factors that May Inhibit the Recording and
Reporting of Fraud
-
A Reluctance to Consider Certain Behaviour
Fraudulent
Wanhill refers to the "classic" book of Mars and Nicod (1984) which considers
the reward system that operates for waiters. Included in the reward system
alongside basic pay, free food and tips, are "fiddles" and "knock-offs",
almost as if they are an accepted practice. The euphemism used for such
minor fraud is the word "perks". There are other practices which are not
always considered fraudulent. An example is the practice of the "kickback"
- an employee accepting a gratuity from a supplier of goods or services
to the hotel.
When is a gift a gift and when is it an act of attempted bribery to
give one party an advantage in dealing with purchasing agents of the enterprise?
-
A Reluctance to Admit that Fraudulent Practices could be Committed
Hotel management in particular seem reluctant to
report theft and even reluctant to admit that employee theft, by senior
management or by base-level staff, could be common.
A report by the Crime Prevention Council of Victoria estimated that
75 to 80% of inventory losses were due to employee theft,. but 95% of the
frauds detected and referred to police
were committed by customers or guests - an indicator that employers may
be turning their backs on the possibility of employee fraud.
A US study found that only 18% of fraudulent actions were uncovered
by internal audit and control - in fact the most common way that frauds
are discovered is through anonymous tip -offs.
-
A Reluctance to Enforce Internal Controls on Employees
Albrecht, Howe and Romney (1984), in a study of 212 frauds committed by
employees, concluded that 82% of frauds came about because there was either
a lack of internal control or the measures were not enforced. Nearly 30%
of frauds came about as a result of collusion, a situation that should
be minimised by the application of the most basic internal controls of
separation of duties.
-
A Reluctance to Prosecute
Of those 212 frauds examined by Albrecht et al. only 51% of the employees
involved were prosecuted by their employer, and of those less than a third
received custodial sentences.
Conclusion
In Wanhill's words, the practices of fraud have often been "condoned
by management", as long as the Chef or the assistant manager "delivers
the right percentages". The problems arise because fraud, " if left unchecked
can result in substantial losses and the liquidation of the business."
The small-scale study of eight clubs in New South Wales indicates that
fraudulent losses in cost of sales and payroll, even if seemingly minor,
can have substantial affects upon the bottom line.
|